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1. INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of expression is often accorded preeminent status at 
the core of human liberty. But as the independent and inherent 
power of ideas rests uncomfortably within the confines of govern-
ment, freedom of expression is often only ambiguously mentioned 
in many national constitutions. In the United States, freedom of 
speech and of the press were only attached to the United States 
Constitution as politically bartered afterthoughts in the Bill of 
Rights. l Even where guaranteed in the strongest terms, as in the 
constitution of the Soviet Union, the right to freedom of expression 
may be little more than a meaningless platitude. Once free speech 
is articulated as a guaranteed human right, the question then be-
comes whether it is a mere phrase of art or legal doctrine. 
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
was intended as a first step toward an International Bill of Rights. 2 
Article 19 of the Declaration provides a legal basis for freedom of 
expression. But the United Nations Charter does not confer a leg-
islative function on the General Assembly, so the formulation of an 
international right to freedom of expression must emerge in the 
evolution of the customary and conventional law which binds na-
tions. 
1 See L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 234 (1985): " ... the Constitution was only 
ratified because crucial states where ratification had been in doubt, were willing to accept the 
promise of a bill of rights in the form of subsequent amendments to the Constitution." 
2 Gross, International Law Aspects of the Freedom of Information and the Right to Communicate, 
in P. HORTON, THE THIRD WORLD AND PRESS FREEDOM 59 (1978). 
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The development of an international right of free expression 
has historically coursed throughout the ideological and political 
spectrum. In the nineteenth century Napoleon is reported to have 
told Metternich, "I would not undertake to govern for three months 
with freedom of the press."3 In contrast, in the 1950s, U.S. Secretary 
of State John Foster Dulles said, "If I were to be granted one point 
of foreign policy and no other, I would make it the free flow of 
information."4 Three decades later a similar deference to freedom 
of expression in the international context was a key reason for the 
1984 United States withdrawal from the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).5 The pul-
lout was in part the culmination of U.S. objections to controversial 
Soviet Bloc and Third World proposals for a "New World Infor-
mation and CQmmunications Order" (NWICO)6 in the UNESCO 
forum. 
The decade-long controversy regarding NWICO has substan-
tially subsided after an exhausting storm of acrimonious debate and 
an endless stream of political and legal scholarship. What began as 
a nascent sense among Third World nations that their story as 
developing nations was poorly communicated to the the world at 
large eventually emerged as a global uproar about competing no-
tions of freedom of the press and national self-destiny. 
In the United Nations the most controversial proposals made 
by proponents of NWICO have not been implemented, but in Third 
3 Quoted in Les Liberties Publiques 330 (1972) cited in T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 181 (1984). 
4 Schiller, The Free Flow of Information-For Whom? in MASS MEDIA POLICIES IN CHANGING 
CULTURES 105 (1977), cited in Kraemer, Freer Expression or Greater Repression? UNESCO and 
the Licensing of Journalists 7 COMM/ENT. L.J. 39,45. 
5 The United States withdrew from UNESCO because, among other reasons, of efforts 
in UNESCO that the Reagan administration contended would impede the "free flow" of 
information. See Letter from Secretary of State George Shultz to the Director-General of 
UNESCO (Dec. 28,1983), reprinted in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
CURRENT DOCUMENTS 282-83 (1985). The three prime reasons stated by the Administration 
for the withdrawal were: 1. The NWICO controversy, 2. concern that UNESCO had become 
too political and 3. the UNESCO budget growth was unacceptable. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 
1985 at AS, co!. 3. 
6 The concept is also known as the New World Information Order, New International 
Information Order and New International Information and Communication Order. Each 
describes concepts seeking to redress weaknesses in world-wide information and communi-
cations systems. A "new order" in the world-wide information construct has been proposed 
not only by the East-bloc and the Non-Aligned Movement and the Third World, but also by 
the Catholic Pope and the Socialist President of France. See Sussman, The Continuing Struggle 
for Freedom of Information in R. GASTIL, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 118 (1982). 
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World nations there has been a steady increase in state control of 
news and information. One result is the emergence of a significant 
new body of international "right to communicate"7 law building 
upon existing principles of freedom of expression. 
While debate on a new information order proceeded in inter-
national conclaves, developing nations increasingly asserted control 
of the news and information flow within their own borders. Because 
the NWI CO concept has defied clear definition it is not possible to 
delineate precisely where proposal and practice relate. Conceptual-
izing and promoting a reordering of international news flow is a 
dimension removed from the reality of Third World nations mod-
ernizing their news and information systems and their laws con-
cerning freedom of expression. In doing so, most Third World 
nations have demonstrated little inclination to follow the American 
model of free speech urged upon them since the end of World War 
II by imperious and self-righteous American news organizations.s 
It is important to consider whether the triumph of NWICO oppo-
nents in UNESCO is but a pyrrhic victory in the face of heightened 
state control of news and information throughout the Third World. 
This Note focuses on Latin America and examines the trend 
in the region to pass laws restricting journalists, in particular laws 
requiring reporters and news organizations to be licensed. As Latin 
America is a divergent community of relatively advanced Third 
World nations undergoing political turmoil, it presents a discrete, 
meaningful focus for an investigation of the development of the 
"right to communicate" in the Third World. The issue of mandatory 
licensing is crucial to the controversy because requiring a journalist 
to obtain a license implies the power to deny participation in the 
free flow of information. The well developed trend toward increas-
ing state control in Latin America has global implications. In the 
words of Dana Bullen of the World Press Freedom Committee, "this 
7 See Anawalt. The Right to Communicate. 13 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 219 (1984): "The 
Right to Communicate seems to have emerged as a proposed legal concept in an article 
concerning direct broadcast satellites written by Jean d'Arcy in 1969. 'The time will come 
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will have to encompasss a more extensive 
right than man's right to information. first laid down twenty one years ago in Article 19. 
This is the right to communicate ... • 
8 See M. BLANCHARD. EXPORTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986). This book is an excellent 
and well-documented treatment of the efforts of the United States State Department and 
American news organizations to seek international freedom of speech through the attachment 
of free press guarantees based on the American model to certain peace treaties and United 
Nations agreements. 
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virus seems to be jumping to Africa, where it could spread like 
wildfire. "9 
Part Two of the Note briefly reviews and updates the UNESCO 
debate concerning the proposed NWICO. Part Three evaluates the 
NWICO concept based upon accepted sources of international law 
and considers whether the products of the UNESCO debate are 
themselves new sources of law. Part Four examines aspects of the 
Latin American experience, including the important case of Ste-
phen Schmidt, an American reporter who was convicted under a 
Costa Rican licensing statute in 1983. The Costa Rican government 
submitted the question of the statute's validity to the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, which in 1985 held it "incompatible" with 
international law. 10 The next year the Inter-American Court handed 
free press advocates and Western news organizations a defeat on a 
different but related issue; in an advisory opinion the Court ruled 
that the Inter-American Convention protects the right to reply or 
correct "inaccurate" or "offensive" news reports. ll The two cases 
will be detailed in a search for clues as to the nature of the emerging 
"right to communicate" as international law in this hemisphere. Part 
Five analyzes the current status of the "right to communicate" in 
Latin America today and questions whether that region's develop-
ment of international law in the area of freedom of expression 
should be considered a precursor of discouraging news for those 
who cherish a free press as a critical human right. 
II. TEN YEARS OF NWICO DEBATE 
1-. The Mass Media Declaration 
In 1978 the eJneral Conference of UNESCO adopted a reso-
lution entitled Delzaration on Fundamental Principles Concerning the 
Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International 
Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering 
Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War. The Mass Media Decla-
ration called for "a free flow and a wider and balanced dissemina-
9 Letter from Dana Bullen to David Cifrino, (Dec. 7, 1987). 
10 Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of 
Journalism (Costa Rica), Ser. OC-5/85 (Inter-American Court of Human Rights Advisory 
Opinion of Nov. 13, 1985), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 123, 124 [hereinafter Opinion]. 
II Enforceability of the Right of Reply or Correction (arts. 14(1).1(1) and 2. American 
Convention on Human Rights). Ser. OC-7/85 (Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
Advisory Opinion of August 29, 1986), reprinted in Inter-American Court Y.B. (1986). 
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tion of information."12 Although the resolution was more moderate 
than an earlier Soviet-sponsored draft proposing "complete govern-
ment control of information media,"13 it was widely viewed in the 
West as a "radical departure from the hitherto acknowledged ideal 
of a free and unfettered flow of information."14 
From the Third World perspective, radical changes were in-
deed required in "the existing order (or disorder)."15 As evidence 
of a media imbalance, Third World representatives noted: 
As regards the Northern Hemisphere 
* Five press Agencies, the big "five" (i.e., the two United States 
agencies, AP and UPI, the British agency Reuters, Agence 
France-Presse and the Soviet TASS) control more than 80 per-
cent of the world news flow; 
* Four radio networks (Voice of America, the BBC, Deutsche 
Welle and Radio Moscow) have a virtual monopoly of all radio 
programs beamed abroad; .... 
* Ninety percent of the available wave spectrum, i.e. the usable 
radio frequencies, is taken up by broadcasts from industrial 
countries; 
* The same is true of the production of television and newsfilms, 
not to mention satellites, computers, micro-processors, video-
texts and the whole range of advanced technology.16 
In regard to the Southern Hemisphere, African proponents of 
NWICO point out that 
... the African continent, which possesses the least advanced 
communication system in the world, is not merely bombarded 
with material from outside, but is also unable to produce, emit 
or receive its own messages. In Gabon, for example, all that is 
known of Kenya or Tanzania is what Reuters and Agence 
France-Presse deign to select and put out from London or Paris. 
It is for this reason that the new international order we 
advocate in the field of information and communication aims 
to reduce the growing inequalities we have just described and 
to achieve in the long run a fairer and better balanced relation-
12 Article I, UNESCO Res. 4/9/.3/2,20 UNESCO Res. 4/9.312.20, UNESCO Gen. Conf. 
Res., UNESCO doc. 20 C/Resolutions, at 100-04 (1978) [hereinafter Mass Media Declaration]. 
13 Draft Declaration on Fundamental Principles Governing the Use of the Mass Media in Strength-
ening Peace and International Understanding and Combating War Propaganda, Racism and Apartheid. 
19 UNESCO Gen. Conf. Rec., UNESCO Doc. 19 C/Proceedings, at 91 (1976). See Wolfe, A 
New International Information Order: The Developing World and the Free Flow of Information 
Controversy 8 SYR. J. INT'L & COM. L. 249, 261 (1981). 
14 Wolfe, supra note 13 at 263. 
15 Ping, What the Third World Wants . .. and Why in WORLD PRESS FREEDOM COMMITTEE, 
THE MEDIA CRISIS ... A CONTINUING CHALLENGE 14 ( 1982). 
16ld. 
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ship between North and South on the basis of equality, freedom, 
mutual benefit and solidarity between nations. 17 
Western news organizations promptly labeled the Mass Media 
Declaration as censorship. In particular, Article II of the Declaration 
was read to suggest government control over news flow and jour-
nalists: "[I]t is important that the mass media be responsive to 
concerns of peoples and individuals, thus promoting the partici-
pation of the public in the elaboration of information."18 Further, 
the goals of the Declaration as stated in the lengthy title -
"Strengthening Peace and International Understanding . . . Pro-
motion of Human Rights ... Countering Racialism, Apartheid and 
Incitement to War" - are understood in the United Nations to 
impute an anti-Western position.19 
The Mass Media Declaration led to the formation of the 
McBride Commission, named for Commission Chairman, Sean 
McBride.20 In an interim report, Commission member Mustapha 
Masmoudi proposed the introduction of a "New World Information 
Order" that would undertake: 
1. regulation of the right to information by preventing abusive 
uses of the right to access to information, 
2. regulation of the collection, processing and transmission of 
news and data across national frontiers and 
3. creation of a supranational organization to oversee the cor-
rection of "false and biased news accounts."21 
In his statement, Masmoudi, Tunisia's delegate to UNESCO, 
asserted: "The new world information order founded on demo-
cratic principles seeks to establish relations of equality in the com-
munications field between developed and developing nations and 
aims at greater justice and greater balance."22 The McBride Report23 
attempted to layout specific solutions to the media imbalance per-
ceived by Third World nations. Although the report decried gov-
ernment intervention and censorship, it advocated codes of ethics 
I7Id. 
18 Article II, UNESCO Res. 4/9.3/2, 20 UNESCO Gen. Conf. Rec., UNESCO Doc. 20 C/ 
Resolutions, at 102 (1978). See Wolfe, supra, note 13 at 262. citing Gordon, Current Legal 
Developments 13 INT'L LAW. 388 (1979). 
I9Id. 
20 McBride, founder of Amnesty International, won both the Nobel and Lenin Peace 
Prizes. He died in January, 1988. See Associated Press, Jan. IS, 1988. 
21 See Kraemer, supra note 4 at 48. 
22 Masmoudi, The New World Information Order, reprinted in 29 J. COMM. 172 (1979). 
23 McBRIDE, ET AL, MANY VOICES ONE WORLD: COMMUNICATION AND SOCIETY TODAY 
AND TOMORROW (1980). 
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for journalists and disapproved of highly centralized private own-
ership of the communications infrastructure.24 Following the release 
of the McBride Report, a NWICO work project first began propos-
ing the issuance of identity cards to journalists.25 
B. The Response to the Mass Media Declaration 
Condemning the licensing scheme and fearing that the pro-
ponents of the Mass Media Declaration sought to increase govern-
ment control over the free flow of information, Western news agen-
cies mobilized and launched a counter-declaration at a 1981 meeting 
in Talloires (hereinafter The Declaration of Talloires).26 Asserting 
that Western nations would oppose any proposal to regulate jour-
nalists, The Declaration of Talloires flatly rejected any attempts to 
license journalists or impose mandatory codes of ethics.27 The Mass 
Media Declaration and the response of the Declaration of Talloires 
focused debate concerning NWICO into the UNESCO arena.28 
Since the withdrawal of the United States and Great Britain 
(and their funding) from UNESCO in 1984,29 neither side has 
yielded any ideological ground. The perspective of proponents of 
NWICO was restated in a recent news item issued by the Xinhua 
News Agency. The story reports that the information ministers of 
the Non-Aligned countries remained committed to NWICO because 
"the present dependence of Non-Aligned countries on the infor-
mation and communication infrastructure and systems of the de-
veloped world continue to constitute a serious threat to the preser-
vation of their cultures and lifestyles."30 The West remains 
committed to the dichotomy as evidenced by a speech by U.S. 
President Ronald Reagan at the United Nations on September 22, 
1987. President Reagan reiterated the opposition of the West to 
NWICO, stating, "We cannot permit attempts to control the media 
24 See Farley, Conflict Over Government Control of Information - The United States and 
UNESCO 59 TULANE L.R. 1071, 1076 (1985). 
2~ The proposals were made in a draft calling for a Commission for the Protection of 
Journalists. See Singh & Gross, "McBride: The Report and the Response, 31 J. COMM. 104, 113 
(1981). 
26 The Declaration of Talloires, Voices of Freedom Conference, France (May 15-17, 
1981), reprinted in N.Y. Times, May 18, 1981 at A14, col. 1. Also reprinted in 31 J. COMM. 104, 
113 (1981). 
27Id. 
28 See New World and Information and Communication Order; A Selective Bibliography, (1984 
ed.), compiled by the Dag Hammarskjold Library of the U.N. 
29 Singapore also withdrew later. 
30 Xinhua News Agency June 12, 1987. 
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and promote censorship under the ruse of the so-called 'New World 
Information Order."'31 
Leading UNESCO during the years of discord was Director 
General Amadou-Mahatar M'Bow of Senegal. He was replaced on 
November 16, 1987 by Spaniard Federico Mayor Zaragoza with the 
unofficial backing of the United States and over the opposition of 
African and Arab nations.32 Although a return to UNESCO by the 
United States and Great Britain is not anticipated in the near future, 
Mayor has expressed reservations about the information program.33 
Upon his election to the position of Director General, Mayor said 
he would seek the return of the United States, Great Britain and 
Singapore to UNESCO, but he would not ask these countries to 
rejoin "at any price."34 But even as Mayor took office, renewed calls 
for a new world information order divided UNESCO's industrial 
and developing nations. In 1988, Mayor attempted to defuse the 
NWICO controversy referring to a "free and uninhibited flow" of 
news and information, rather than the more politically charged call 
for a "balanced" flow. 35 Critics of Mayor claim the new Director 
General has been too "timid" in seeking ways to end the four year 
boycott of UNESCO.36 In the meantime, the United States observer 
to UNESCO stated recently that the U.S. has no present intention 
to return to UNESCO as long as its program remains unchanged, 
despite "a new director who is friendly to the West."37 
In November of 1987, Sweden, Denmark and Japan opposed 
as "wasteful" a plan proposed by China, Liberia, Ghana, Mongolia, 
Libya and Venezuela to allot $24 million to investigate the potential 
of a new world information service.38 Also in 1987, in the United 
Nations General Assembly, Third World nations successfully se-
cured passage of a resolution providing developing nations with 
greater access to new technology.39 The resolution requested 
31 23 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 1051. See also Associated Press, Sep. 22, 1987. 
32 N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1987 at AI, col. 1. 
33Id. See also Associated Press, Nov. 7, 1987. 
34 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1987, sec. 1 at 6, col. 1. 
35 Telephone interview with Leonard Sussman, Executive Director of Freedom House, 
New York (Sep. 14, 1988). 
'6 N.Y. Times, July 6, 1988, A4 col. 3. The newspaper reported that "UNESCO's shrink-
ing budget is barely enough to pay the salaries of 2,500 demoralized staff members who are 
waiting for the time when so called "North-South" confrontation comes to an end and 
UNESCO finds a sense of direction." 
37Id. 
'8 See Inter-Press Service, Nov. 4, 1987, UNESCO, Renewed Debate on New World Information 
Order. 
'9 See Reuters, Dec. 8, 1987. 
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UNESCO and the entire U.N. system to provide all possible assis-
tance to developing countries for their needs in the information 
field. The United States cast the only negative vote against the 
resolution, which was adopted by 136 votes with fifteen abstentions. 
The U.S. was again the lone dissenting vote when the General 
Assembly adopted a resolution (by 140 votes) approving an inter-
national program for the development of information and aimed 
at an alleged imbalance in that field. 40 
The Mass Media Declaration by UNESCO is not in and of itself 
legally binding upon any nation.4! The Declaration merely consti-
tutes a statement, albeit a landmark pronouncement, of a concept 
with many forms and agenda. That is not to say it has been without 
impact in the relationship of governments to news media organi-
zations. Although UNESCO has never approved a resolution con-
doning the licensing42 of journalists, one expert points out that 
"[t]he popular belief runs counter to that fact. This results from 
years of acrimonious debate at UNESCO during which licensing of 
journalists was mentioned by delegates of countries which practice 
licensing."43 The importance of the Mass Media Declaration lies 
largely in its polemic role. Kaarl Nordenstreng, President of the 
International Organization of Journalists, noted that 
The declaration came to serve as a symbol and catalyst for 
conflict between the forces of the new order and its adversaries. 
No wonder then, that this document became controversial; it 
stood not only for what was written in its text, but came to 
symbolize the struggle between conflicting forces in the world 
arena as well. 44 
While widespread discussion of licensing journalists prompted by 
the Declaration has raged,45 Third World nations have passed laws 
40 [d. 
41 A declaration is generally considered a statement of policy and principle. It cannot be 
invoked against a signatory which violates its terms, but it may be consulted in order to 
interpret the provisions of binding conventions and treaties. See Gross, supra note 2 at 72. 
42 The subject of licensing has come up in numerous UNESCO meetings. For example 
in February of 1981 a conference explored the possibility of a Commission for the Protection 
of Journalists. See 31 J. COMM. 104, 1I3. The proposal called for the issuance of identification 
cards to reporters. Although the stated goal was the protection of journalists, the proposal 
was tabled after strong opposition from Western nations concerned about restricting jour-
nalists. 
43 Sussman, introduction to MCCOLM, To LICENSE A JOURNALIST, THE OPINION OF THE 
INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 8 (1986). 
44 The U.S. Decision to Withdraw from UNESCO 34 J. COMM. 160 (1984), quoting K. NOR-
DENSTRENG, THE MASS MEDIA DECLARATION OF UNESCO (1984). 
45 There is some debate about whether the dispute on a New World Information Order 
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to license their reporters and news media.46 The pertinent ques-
tions, then, are (1) whether the licensing of reporters and further 
restrictions on independent journalism are in accord with interna-
tional law and (2) whether the Mass Media Declaration provides a 
new source of authority for such restrictive practices. 
III. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Whether or not a licensing program conforms to international 
law depends upon whether international agreements create any 
rights in journalists sufficient to overcome a nation's domestic ju-
risdiction over its own affairs. Under the principle of domestic 
jurisdiction states are free to exercise sovereignty within their own 
borders subject to the counter-balancing principle that states are 
prohibited from failing to fulfill their obligations under interna-
tionallaw by invoking domestic law.47 It follows that 
. . . absent an obligation derived from customary or conven-
tional international law, the state is the "sole judge" even though 
the subject matter is of concern to other states or of international 
concern .... If there is no principle or rule by which a state 
includes discussion of licensing. Assistant Professors of Communications Eileen Mahoney 
and Colleen Roach of the City College of New York and Fordham University, respectively, 
argue that the NWICO has dealt with "much broader socioeconomic and cultural issues 
relating to the third world's information dependence on the industrialized countries. It cannot 
be reduced to alleged discussions of licensing. While some member states of UNESCO may 
license journalists in their own countries, this was never the UNESCO position, nor is it to 
be found in any document or resolution dealing with the New Information Order." N.Y. 
Times Dec. 5, 1987, Letter to Editor, sec. 1 at 26, col. 6. 
However, in a letter of rebuttal, L. Robert Primoff of New York writes that UNESCO 
"supported and constantly worked to develop licensing and codes of conduct for journalists, 
and was blocked only by the vigor of Western objections, including those of the media. Its 
efforts were thinly masked by code words that UNESCO participants understood, such as 
"protection of journalists" and "regulations of their "working conditions". 
Primoff cites UNESCO's draft program and budget for 1984-85 (Document 22 ciS) in 
which budget approvals were sought to study "the right to communicate," "access to and 
participation in communication" and "the communicator's responsibilities," so as to improve 
understanding between journalists' "freedom" and "responsibility". By formal resolution the 
Director General of UNESCO was asked to implement these activities "with a view to estab-
lishing ... a new world information and communication order." 
Primoff writes "the threat was real and not media-generated; and so Congress felt when 
it enacted the Beard Amendment to the 1982-83 Department of State Authorization Act, 
calling upon Unesco to "cease efforts to attempt to regulate news content and to formulate 
rules and regulations for the operation of the world press and prohibiting United States 
funds for Unesco if that organization "implements any policy or procedure ... to license 
journalists" or to "impose mandatory codes of journalistic practices or ethics." N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 8, 1987, Letter to Editor at A22, col. 5. 
46 See Sussman, supra note 6. 
47 See HORTON, supra note 2 at 57. 
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binds itself in relation to another state, it may exclude any aliens 
or books or newspapers or raw materials or manufactured 
goods.48 
127 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
(the principal judicial organ of the United Nations) sets forth the 
accepted sources of international law: 
1. International Conventions, primarily treaties. 
2. International Customary Law. 
3. General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations.49 
Critics of the Mass Media Declaration were quick to claim that 
it was contrary to international law as promulgated by the United 
Nations in that the declaration emphasized state control of news 
and information rather than protection of individual rights of free-
dom of expression. 50 The U.N. Charter makes only general refer-
ence to "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and 
for fundamental freedoms for all,"51 but Article 19 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states, "[e]veryone has a right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas through any media and regard-
less of frontiers."52 Unlike the United Nations Charter, the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights is not legally binding. The Dec-
laration does have force as an authoritative interpretation of the 
Charter. 53 The right in Article 19 is only vaguely limited by Article 
29 which provides: "Everyone has duties to the community in which 
alone the free and full development of his personality is possible."54 
The language of Article 19 of the Universal Declaration is 
found in almost identical form in the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights,55 which is binding upon the states which 
48Id at 58. 
49 U.N. CHARTER, art. 92, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (1945). 
50 See Theberge, U.N.E.S.C.O's "New World Information Order": Colliding with First Amend-
ment Values, 67 A.B.A. J. 714, 718 (1981). 
51 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3. 
52 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc Al810 
at 71 (1948). 
53 See Wolfe, supra, note 13 at 253. 
54 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 29(2). 
55 The Covenant reads: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart informations and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing, or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media 
of his choice. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, opened for signature 19 Dec. 
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are parties to the document. 56 The Covenant does not guarantee 
freedom of expression in absolute terms. The rights are qualified 
by "special duties and responsibilities"57 subjecting the freedom to 
restrictions "[£Jor the protection of national security or of public 
order. "58 These qualifications are open to interpretation by states 
bent on exercising control of news and information for political 
purposes. 59 
The Helsinki Accords adopted in 1975 provide for the "Im-
provement of Working Conditions for Journalists,"60 but the Con-
ference documents are not binding.61 Another international source 
of law frequently cited in the NWICO debate is the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949.62 The provisions of these treaties are legally bind-
ing upon the parties to the agreements, but the provisions are 
activated only during times of war. Article 79 of the Geneva Con-
ventions Protocol I permits the issuance of identification cards to 
journalists,63 but there is no requirement that the journalist procure 
a card.64 
In Latin America, an important source of international law 
regarding freedom of expression is the American Convention of 
Human Rights ,(hereinafter "the Convention") which is binding 
upon signing parties.65 Article 1366 contains language almost iden-
1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (no.16) 52, U.N. Doc. Al6316 (1966), entered 
into force Mar. 1976. 
56 46 countries are parties to the Covenant, including the Latin American countries of 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Ecuador, and Barbados. See Wolfe, supra, note 13 at 
253 n.27. 
57 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19(3), supra, note 55. 
58Id. 
59 Wolfe, supra, note 13 at 254. 
60 Final Act, Basket III, The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (Final Act), adopted August 1, 1975. See BUERGANTHAL, HUMAN RIGHTS, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD (1977). 
61 See Kraemer, supra, note 4 at 64. 
62 Geneva Conventions of 1949, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950 6 U.S. T.3114, 75 
U.N.T.S.31;6 U.N.T.S.135; 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 285. 
63 Geneva Conventions, Protocol I, art. 79(3). 
64 Id. 
65 American Convention on Human Rights, opened for sigrwture Nov. 22, 1969, OEAI 
Ser.UV 111.50. doc. 6 (1980). As of 1986 the following Latin American countries have signed 
the pact: Argentina, Barbados, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
United States, Uruguay, Venezuala. Mexico, Haiti and Bolivia have deposited instruments of 
ratification or adherence. The following states have accepted jurisdiction of the Inter-Amer-
ican Court of Human Rights: Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. 1986 Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Appendix 
VII. 
66 Id. at art. 13(2). 
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tical to the International Covenant, including the restnctIons on 
rights for the protection of national security and public order: 
Article 13, Freedom of Thought and Expression 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and ex-
pression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and im-
part information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through 
any other medium of one's choice. 
2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing 
paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be 
subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be ex-
pressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure: 
a. respect for the rights or reputations of others, or 
b. the protection of national security, public order, or public 
health or morals. 
3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect 
methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private 
controls over newsprint, information, or by any other means to 
impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opin-
ions.67 
An important statement on international law in the Western 
hemisphere is the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man.68 Article IV states that "[e]very person has the right 
to freedom of investigation, of opinion, and of the expression and 
dissemination of ideas, by any medium whatsoever."69 In building 
on this foundation, the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights has stated: 
Freedom of Expression is universal and its concept embodies 
the legal rights of all persons, individually or collectively, to 
express, transmit and disseminate their thoughts; parallel and 
correlative thereto, freedom to become informed is also univer-
sal, and entails the collective right of individuals to receive the 
information communicated to them by others without any in-
terference that might distort it.70 
A legal basis for NWICO often cited by its proponents is the 
fundamental right of sovereignty. The United Nations Charter af-
firms the "principle of the sovereign equality of all its members."71 
This is most clearly exemplified in the Soviet view that the "freedom 
67Id. at art. 13. 
68 Adopted on May 2, 1948. Reprinted in Handbook of Existing Rules Pertaining to 
Human Rights, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/SER.UV/I1.50, doc.6, at 17 (1980). 
69Id. art. IV. 
70 1981 Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 122 (Span-
ish version). 
71 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para.I. 
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to send information [is] violative of the freedom of receiving coun-
tries to be protected from unwanted and detrimental information 
and communication. Soviet writers have stressed that the legal basis 
of international exchange of information should be national sov-
ereignty."72 Soviet legal thought "considers human rights to be a 
matter of domestic jurisdiction. Therefore, according to this posi-
tion, protection of individual rights by an international body con-
stitutes interference in violation of the U.N. Charter."73 
A second legal basis identified as supporting the NWICO con-
cept is "cultural protectionism," which has developed since the 
founding of the United Nations. The U.N. International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights permits states to protect 
national culture.74 Furthermore, the Civil and Political Covenant 
allows "government restriction upon the free flow of information 
in order to comply with national cultural policies by the inclusion 
of an ordre public exception to Article 19."75 This ability to restrict 
expressions can be disapproved by the Human Rights Committee 
under the Optional Protocol. 76 Interests which may be justifiably 
protected in the name of "public order" are identified as: 
1) preservation of the international community heritage 
2) protection of national freedom of choice, or the possibility 
... [of] diversity of development 
3) protection of local economic enterprise, and 
4) protection of internal social and political order.77 
Some proponents of NWICO suggest that the Mass Media 
Declaration itself has become customary law since its acceptance by 
acclamation in the United Nations ten years ago.7S This proposition 
is based upon widespread acceptance of the Declaration as a uni-
form inter-state practice. NWICO opponents flatly reject this view: 
The Mass Media Declaration stands in stark contrast to the 
definition of an international custom. The Declaration satisfies 
neither of the identified requirements for a custom. It does not 
embody a uniform inter-state practice. Accordingly, because 
72 Raube-Wilson, The New World Information and Communication Order and International 
Human Rights Law 9 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L.R. 107, 122 (1986). 
73Id. 
74Id. 
75Id. 
76Id. 
77Id. 
78 161 countries, including the U.S., approved adoption of the declaration. See Sussman 
& Sussman, Mass Media and International Law 7 POL. SCIENCE REV. 344 (1986). 
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there is no extant uniform practice, there is no legal compulsion 
by states to adhere to such practice.79 
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Even without legal binding force, it was recognized early on 
that the Mass Media Declaration was "indicative of a strong ten-
dency in the direction of dirigisme, or state control."80 Thus, the 
importance of the Mass Media Declaration lies not so much in 
attempts to endow it with the force of international law, but its 
articulation and justification of an international legal right to com-
municate which is at time at odds with traditional American liber-
tarian notions of freedom of expression.8l 
IV. LATIN AMERICA AND PRESS FREEDOM 
A. Background 
Latin America is not hospitable to freedom of the press. Cur-
rently, eleven Latin American and Caribbean nations require jour-
nalists to be licensed: Costa Rica, Haiti, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, 
Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Honduras and 
Guatemala.82 Frequent reports of arrests and detentions have led 
the Inter-American Press Association to declare that freedom of 
expression is non-existent in several Latin American countries.83 
Freedom House, the New York based human rights organization, 
reports84 that in 1986 a record number of journalists were mur-
dered in Latin America, including four in Mexico alone.85 In many 
nations repression of the press ranges from restrictive legislation to 
intimidation and outright violence directed against journalists. Beat-
ings, jailings and detention of reporters have been common in 
Paraguay and Panama.86 The overthrow of the Duvalier regime in 
791d. at 357. 
80 Gross, supra, note 2 at 72. 
81 A right to communicate as envisioned by Jean d'Arcy, supra note 7, might well include 
a right to reply or rectification of news reports. In the United States, a right to reply was 
rejected in Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). The court held that a Florida 
statute requiring newspapers to grant political candidates equal space to answer criticisms 
and attacks on his or her record violated the First Amendment by intruding into the function 
of editors to choose what material to publish and in deciding on the treatment of public 
issues and officials. Id. at 258. 
82 See Sussman, Press Freedom, Secrecy and Censors 10, in Freedom at Issue (1987). 
83 Associated Press, Mar. 20, 1980. 
84 See Sussman, supra note 82. 
85Id. 
B61d. 
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Haiti brought relative press freedom, only to be shattered by the 
ruling military junta:87 
As the local and foreign press has reported on killings and 
other human rights abuses by the Army, the Army has subjected 
it to increasingly violent attack. These attacks are all the more 
striking in light of the dramatic liberalization of press freedoms 
that had occurred in Haiti following the flight of Duvalier in 
February 1986.88 
Although there were some improvements upon Haiti's 1980 
Press Law, the new regime incorporated a number of arbitrary and 
repressive provisions into a new press law following the overthrow 
of the Duvalier government. America's Watch, an arm of the human 
rights organization which monitors the Helsinki Accords, criticizes 
several aspects of the new Press Law, including the licensing pro-
ViSions: 
Article 10 removes from the owner or director of a printlbroad-
cast medium the authority to decide who to employ. This article 
makes it a requirement that all licensed journalists have a uni-
versity diploma or its equivalent in order to qualify for the 
required journalists' card. Following the Duvalier's ouster, many 
new newspapers and magazines began publication, a testimony 
to the great surge of democratic ideals being expressed through-
out the country. Most are small, with limited circulation and 
limited means, and staffed by students. By restricting the profes-
sion of journalism to those with a university diploma, this article 
has the effect of reducing and limiting the number of publica-
tions, and increasing the ability of the government to control 
the reduced number meeting the requirements. It is certainly 
no incentive to freedom and diversity of the press.89 
In Paraguay and Chile one commentator writes that the ruling 
regimes "harass the press into self-censorship. In Orwellian fashion 
they employ constitutions and statutes designed to protect press 
freedom, in order to restrict undesirable news and publications."9o 
In Paraguay both the most important daily newspaper, ABC Color, 
and the most active radio station, Radio Nanduti, have been shut 
down and their owners imprisoned many times under the 34 year 
rule of General Alfredo Stroessner.91 
87 [d. 
88 America's Watch, Haiti - Terror and the 1987 Elections 41 (Nov. 1987). 
89 America's Watch, Duvalierism After Duvalier 44-45 (1986). 
90 Sussman, Communication: Openness and Censorship in R. GASTIL, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 
1987-1988 142 (1988). 
91 [d. 
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In 1987 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
issued a highly critical Report on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Paraguay.92 The Commission found that both the legal structure 
regulating free expression and the acts of the government "violate 
the rights guaranteed by the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man [and] create an atmosphere that makes journal-
ism difficult and dangerous, requiring courage and daring from 
those who would exercise it freely."93 The 1967 Paraguayan Con-
stitution addresses freedom of expression and thought in the fol-
lowing terms: 
Article 71. Freedom of thought and opinion are guaranteed on 
equal terms to all inhabitants of the republic. It is forbidden to 
preach hatred or class struggle among Paraguayans, or to de-
fend crime or violence. The laws may be criticized freely, but 
no one may proclaim disobedience to their provisions. 94 
The Commission found that on the basis of prohibitions in 
Article 71 of the Constitution, a number of laws have been repeat-
edly used to "silence simple statements of disagreement by the 
opposition."95 For example, the Report stated, 
Article 8 of Law 294 provides that if any of the crimes punish-
able by law on the "Defense of Democracy" are committed "by 
the press, radio broadcasting stations, or news and information 
agencies, the services of those responsible will be suspended for 
a period of one to six months. In the event of a repetition or 
recurrence it will be closed .... " In turn, Law 209 of 1970 on 
Defense of Public order and Freedom of Individuals contains 
provisions that because they are excessively vague and general 
may constitute - and in fact have already done so - serious 
restrictions on the freedoms of expression and opinion. Such is 
the case of Article 4, which stipulates one to six years in the 
penitentiary for anyone who "through any means shall publicly 
preach hatred among Paraguayans or destruction of the social 
classes."96 
In a similar report on human rights in Chile issued in 198597 
the Inter-American Commission embraced a finding made by the 
92 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Paraguay, OEA/ser.UV/Il.71, doc. 19 rev. 1, 
Sep. 28, 1987. Original: Spanish. 
931d. at 75. 
94 CONSTITUCION art. 71 (Para.). 
95 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Paraguay, supra note 92 at 65. 
96ld. 
9? Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, OEA/ser.UVIl1.66. doc. 17, Sep. 27, 
1985. Original: Spanish. 
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Chilean Association of Journalists that "the freedom to state opin-
ions and impart information without prior censorship of any kind 
and by means, guaranteed by [the Chilean] Constitution, had been 
virtually abolished in Chile."98 A recent account indicates that more 
than thirty laws and regulations restrict the news media in Chile.99 
One law prohibits coverage of the Communist party or any orga-
nization which "propogate doctrines that offend the family, pro-
pound violence or are based on a totalitarian conception of the state 
or on class struggle."JOo Following failed assassination attempts 
against Chilean President Augusto Pinochet, the press in Chile has 
suffered severe losses. 101 The situation in Chile is not new. The 
president of the National Press Association says "there has been no 
liberty of the press here since 1973," the year the military govern-
ment took power. 102 The 1980 Chilean Constitution ostensibly guar-
antees freedom of speech with restrictions in accord with "right to 
communicate" concepts, including the right of every "natural or 
juridical person offended or unjustly alluded to in some mass com-
munications medium .,. to have his declaration or rectification 
gratuitously disseminated, under the conditions determined by law, 
by the mass communications media in which such information was 
issued."103 The legal apparatus plays a key role in the government 
repression of the Chilean press as detailed in a recent America's 
Watch report: 
Editors and journalists of ... publications have been ha-
rassed .... The harassment includes legal charges and deten-
tions of editors. Father Renato Hevia, director of Mensaje, was 
held for two weeks in December 1984 for having published 
articles allegedly insulting to Gen. Pinochet. Cauce editor Juan 
Jorge Faundes and other Cauce journalists were arrested in 
August 1986 as a result of an article questioning the govern-
ment's account of the discovery of clandestine arms cache. 
Faundes had been arrested in July in connection with an inter-
view appearing in Cauce. Also in July 1986, charges were filed 
against 29 editors, reporters and contributors to Analisis in con-
nection with articles that had appeared from January to June 
98 [d. at 196-7. 
99 Unger, How the Junta in Chile Keeps Press in Control, Boston Globe, Jan. 10, 1988 at A-
21, col 1. 
100 [d. 
101 Sussman, supra note 80. 
102 See Chile's Press Wonders: Just How Free is Free?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1987, sec. 1 at 4, 
col. I. 
103 CONSTITUCION art. 10, as amended, 1970 (Chile). 
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in the magazine; as a result, Analisis editor Juan Pablo Cardenas 
was jailed from July 29 to August 26,1986. 104 
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In Nicaragua, La Prensa, the last newspaper opposing the San-
dinista government was closed in 1986, then allowed to reopen in 
1987 by agreement with President Daniel Ortega "without restric-
tions except those imposed by responsible journalism."105 It is not 
clear just what may be found to be irresponsible journalism. The 
Catholic radio station was also shut down and only reopened as a 
political concession. Both outlets operate under the threat of cen-
sorship and reclosure. The heavy hand upon the press is enforced 
by law in Nicaragua. Early in this decade the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs promulgated a law which severely restricted independent 
journalism. Despite a statement in Article I of the law supporting 
freedom of expression, the draft undermines the concept at length. 
Article 24 states that "every publication or broadcast shall express 
a legitimate preoccupation for the defense or gains of the revolu-
tion, the process of reconstruction ... and should not be the in-
strument of anti-popular interests."106 The law created an Admin-
istration of Means of Communication (DMC) which would "process, 
pass judgment, and resolve with regard to authorization, suspen-
sion, renewal, and cancellation of the permits and licenses for the 
operation of the means of social communication .... "107 Under the 
law, news organizations are required to reveal to the DMC "the 
sources on which their information is based."108 
The licensing law conforms to general Sandinistan policy. Ac-
cording to one source, "[t]he Sandinista regime in Nicaragua has 
followed a policy of strict censorship arrests and harassment of 
independent journalists since 1979 when the General Law of the 
Mass Media of Social Communications was approved by the revo-
lutionary junta."I09 
B. Costa Rica Law No. 4420 
Repression of the press in Nicaragua, Chile, Paraguay and Haiti 
goes beyond legislation to overt repressive tactics by dictators. The 
104 America's Watch, Human Rights in Chile 42 (1987). 
105 GASTlL, supra note 90 at 144. 
106 R. GASTlL, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD-POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 115 
(1982). 
107Id. 
108Id. 
109 See Farley, supra note 24 at lO80, n. 54. 
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actions of these governments mostly mock international law rather 
than contribute to its development. It is, however, among the meth-
ods of these regimes to use legislation and regulation to restrict 
freedom of expression - such as licensing or a provision guaran-
teeing a right of rectification or clarification. It is troubling to free 
press advocates that these same laws can be found in the legal 
structure of communication in freer nations of Latin America. Costa 
Rica, considered among the region's most stable and democratic 
states110 submitted its licensing statute - Law No. 4420111 - to the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights for an advisory opinion. 
In a landmark decision in November of 1985, the court unani-
mously held that "the compulsory licensing of journalists is incom-
patible with Article 13 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights if it denies any person access to the full use of the news 
media as a means of expressing himself or imparting inform a-
tion."112 
The case involved United States reporter Stephen Schmidt who 
was working for The Tieo Times, an English language weekly in San 
Jose, Costa Rica. Schmidt challenged Law 4420, known as the "Or-
ganic Law of the College of Journalists of Costa Rica." The statute, 
llD See MCCOLM, supra note 43. 
III Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of 
Journalism (Costa Rica), Ser. OC-5/85 (Inter-American Court of Human Rights Advisory 
Opinion of Nov. 13, 1985. See supra, note 10. 
The court identified the following excerpt as the relevant provisions of Public Law. No. 
4420: 
ARTICLE 2. The Association of Journalists of Costa Rica shall be composed of the 
following: 
a) Holders of Licenciate or Bachelor degree in Journalism, graduated from the University 
of Costa Rica or from comparable universities or institutions abroad, admitted to membership 
in the Association in accordance with laws and treaties, 
b) If there is a lack of professional journalists, the Association may authorize persons with a 
vocation for journalism to practice the profession, after certifying their merits, technical 
know-how and moral standing. 
ARTICLE 22-The function of a journalist can only be a 
carried out by duly registered members of the Association. 
ARTICLE 23-For purposes of this law, the phrase "practicing professional journalist" shall 
be understood to mean the person whose principal, regular or paid occupation it is to practice 
his profession in a daily or periodic publication, or in radio or television news media, or in 
a news agency, and for whom such work represents his or her principal source of income. 
ARTICLE 25-Columnists and permanent or occasional commentators in all types of news 
media may, whether or not they receive pay, freely carry out their activities without being 
obliged to belong to the Association, however, their scope of activities shall be restricted to 
that specific area and they shall not be permitted to work as specialized or non-specialized 
reporters. [d. at 144. 
ll2 [d. at 145. 
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passed in 1969, created an officially sanctioned journalists' associa-
tion, the Colegio de Periodistas, which was authorized to train and 
license journalists. Despite several years of experience as a reporter 
in Costa Rica and a graduate degree in interpretative reporting 
from Autonomous University of Central America, Schmidt was de-
nied a license to practice journalism because the Colegio refused to 
recognize degrees from Autonomous University. 
In January of 1983 Schmidt was acquitted at trial in a decision 
which marked the first time that the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights and the American Convention of Human Rights had 
been used in a court decision in the western hemisphere. 113 Judge 
Jeanette Sanchez of the Second Penal Court of San Jose ruled that 
Costa Rica was required to give precedence to its treaty obligations 
over its domestic legislation: 
Our Magna Carta, in Article 7, stipulates, in paragraph (1): 
"Public treaties, international agreements and concords duly 
approved by the Legislative Assembly, shall from time of their 
acceptance have authority higher than of laws." 
Applying the above to the concrete case, we see that Ste-
phen Schmidt "was seeking out, receiving, or disseminating in-
formation ... in written form." His conduct therefore corre-
sponds with the exercise of what may be called that higher right, 
which is freedom of expression, and which, as stated, must not 
be restricted by any indirect means. The foregoing demon-
strates that the legal nature of a College of Journalists cannot 
be the same as is essential to other professional colleges, since 
in the former activity use is made of one of the most precious 
public freedoms of human beings, that is to express their 
thoughts. I 14 
In June of 1983 Costa Rica's Supreme Court reversed the lower 
court and annulled the acquittal. The decision was based on a 
perceived need to protect the standards of professionals governed 
by various colleges: 
[T]he public interest involved in the general exercise of the 
professions, which interest serves as a legitimate reason for the 
protectionist intervention of the State in view of the necessity 
for such activities to be performed by highly qualified persons, 
that is, those with abilities derived from university studies and 
the professional titles obtained in the manner stipulated in the 
law or regulations .... 115 
113 See MCCOLM, supra note 43 at 15. 
114Id. at 16. 
115Id. at 16-17. 
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The case was appealed to the Inter-American Human Rights 
Commission in Washington which handed Schmidt an unfavorable 
ruling, declaring: "Costa Rican law No. 4420 ... and the decision 
handed down by the ... Supreme Court of Justice of Costa Rica 
. . . did not constitute a violation of Article 13 of the [American 
Convention on Human Rights.],,1l6 Following defeat in Washington, 
the Inter-American Press Association persuaded the Costa Rican 
government to seek an advisory opinion from the Inter-American 
Court not only on the Schmidt case specifically, but also on the 
broader question of mandatory licensing of journalists. The court 
ruled unanimously on both issues that the licensing of journalists is 
incompatible with freedom of expression as guaranteed in Article 
13 of the Convention. ll7 
The court noted that Article 13(2) "stipulates in the first place 
that prior censorship is always incompatible with the full enjoyment 
of the rights listed in Article 13."118 Therefore, the court said, abuse 
of the right of freedom of expression can be controlled only by 
"subsequent ... sanctions,"1l9 and only in accordance with a four 
part standard formulated by the court with heavy reliance upon the 
language of the Convention. Section 2 of Article 13 allows imposi-
tion of liability for abuse of freedom of expression "to the extent 
necessary to ensure: a. respect for the rights or reputations of 
others, or b. the protection of national security, public order, or 
public health or morals."120 In its opinion, the court laid down four 
requirements which must be met before liability could be imposed: 
a) the existence of previously established grounds for liability, 
b) the express and precise definition of these grounds by law, 
c) the legitimacy of the ends sought to be achieved, 
d) a showing that these grounds of liability are "necessary to 
ensure" the aforementioned ends. 121 
The court emphasized that it was not enough for the govern-
ment to show that the statute in question serves a useful or desirable 
purpose. Rather, the court wrote, 
to be compatible with the convention, the restrictions must be 
justified by reference to governmental objectives which, because 
116 Case 9178, INTER-AM. C.H.R., OEA/ser. UV/II.63, doc. 15 (1984). 
117Id. at 145. 
IISId. at 132. 
IlgId. 
12°Id. 
121Id. 
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of their importance, clearly outweigh the social need for the full 
enjoyment of the right Article 13 guarantees. Implicit in this 
standard, furthermore, is the notion that the restriction, even 
if justified by compelling governmental interests, must be so 
framed as not to limit the right protected by Article 13 more 
than is necessary.122 
139 
The court rejected the Costa Rican government's argument that 
the licensing scheme was justified as necessary to ensure public 
order, a protected interest under subsection 2(b). The court stressed 
that "public order ... may under no circumstances be invoked as a 
means of denying a right guaranteed by the Convention."123 More-
over, the court stated "that same concept of public order in a dem-
ocratic society requires the guarantee of the widest possible circu-
lation of news, ideas and opinions as well as the widest access to 
information by society as a whole."124 
Conceding that some licensing schemes might be incompatible 
with the Convention, the government argued that Costa Rican Law 
No. 4420 was not incompatible because it did not seek to license 
commentators or columnists and thus did not restrict ideas or opin-
ions. The court merely pointed out that "the Convention does not 
only guarantee the right to seek, receive and impart ideas but also 
information of all kinds."125 
Western news organizations hailed the decision in the Schmidt 
case as an important landmark in international freedom of expres-
sion law. 126 The ruling did create a precedent, but as an advisory 
opinion the Costa Rican government was free to ignore the court's 
decision, which it has done. Law No. 4420 remains on the books 
and Stephen Schmidt remains a convicted felon. 
C. The Right of Reply 
The next case to come before the Inter-American Court re-
garding an issue of freedom of expression involved a Costa Rican 
press law that guaranteed a right of reply or correction to anyone 
injured by an "inaccurate" or "offensive" publication or broadcast. 
This time the advisory opinion was a setback for press freedom 
groups and an important qualification upon the Schmidt decision. 
122 [d. at 135. 
123 !d. at 140. 
124 [d. at 14l. 
125 [d. at 145. 
126 See MCCOLM, supra note 43 
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In its opinion the court held unanimously that Article 14(1)127 
of the American Convention of Human Rights "recognizes an in-
ternationally enforceable right to reply or to make a correction 
which, under Article 1(1), the State Parties have the obligation to 
respect and to ensure the free and full exercise thereof to all persons 
subject to their jurisdiction."128 The court also held that States which 
are parties to the Convention have an obligation "to adopt, in ac-
cordance with its constitutional processes and the provisions of the 
Convention, the legislative or other measures that may be necessary 
to give effect to this right."129 
Again, the Costa Rican government solicited an advisory opin-
ion. In an amicus curiae brief several news and press freedom or-
ganizations argued that 
... communications media may not be made subject to a "right 
of reply" under Article 14 unless they are "legally regulated," 
and such regulation would have to consist of a pervasive scheme, 
including government licensing of the medium in question. Un-
der the provisions of Article 12 and 13 of the Convention, how-
ever, imposition of a licensing requirement on the free press is 
contrary to the fundamental right of free expression, and thus 
imposition of a "right of reply" on the press contravenes the 
provisions of Articles 12, 13 and 14(1). [citing Advisory Opinion 
OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985 (compulsory licensing in an 
association prescribed by law for the practice of journalism)].l30 
The court rejected the argument that under the Schmidt opinion 
the right to freedom of thought and expression in Article 13 
superseded the right of reply in Article 14: 
The fact that the right of reply or correction (Art.l4) follows 
immediately after the right to freedom of thought and expres-
sion (Art.13) confirms this interpretation. The inescapable re-
lationship between these articles can be deduced from the na-
ture of the rights recognized therein, since, in regulating the 
127 Article 14 reads as follows: 
1. Anyone injured by inaccurate or offensive statements or ideas disseminated to the public 
in general by a legally regulated medium of communication has the right to reply or to make 
a correction using the same communications outlet, under such conditions as the law may 
establish. 
Enforceability of the Right of Reply or Correction (arts. 14(1),1(1) and 2 American 
Convention on Human Rights). Ser. OC-7/85 (Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
Advisory Opinion of August 29, 1986) See supra note 11. at 53. 
128 [d. at 58. 
129 [d. 
130 Amici Curaie brief of Inter-American Press Association, World Press Freedom Com-
mittee, American Newspaper Publishers Association, et al. at 17. 
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application of the right of reply or correction, the State Parties 
must respect the right of freedom of expression guaranteed by 
Article 13. They may not, however, interpret the right of free-
dom of expression so broadly as to negate the right of reply 
proclaimed by Article 14(1) (Compulsory Membership of Jour-
nalists, supra 18 para. 18). It is appropriate to recall that Res-
olution (74) 26 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe based the right of reply on Article 10 of the European 
Convention, which deals with freedom of expression. 131 
V. CONCLUSION 
141 
In political terms freedom of the press is often considered the 
most important component of freedom of expression. The Schmidt 
decision certifies the right of reporters to perform without licensing 
restraints. The Inter-American Court's opinion in the right of reply 
case, however, places equal weight on the right of individuals or the 
government to access the news media and participate in a two way 
flow of communication. This balancing approach lends credence to 
Third World advocates of a "right to communicate" which envisions 
communication as a catalyst for cultural preservation and national 
self determination. Read narrowly, it can be foreseen that if a court 
were to issue a similar, but binding, decision upon a party to the 
American Convention, that state would be obligated to cease that 
practice. In the absence of binding decisions interpreting applicable 
treaty law, however, the growing practice of Latin American coun-
tries to impose controls on the news media effectively repudiates 
claims that customary law prohibits state control of news and infor-
mation. 
"The purpose of international law," one commentator writes, 
"is to influence states to recognize and accept human rights, to 
reflect these rights in their national institutions and to incorporate 
them into national ways of life."132 It is for this reason that the 
NWICO battle has consumed so much energy and attention in the 
past decade. The democratic view of the human right of freedom 
of expression allows for public policy restrictions such as protecting 
individuals from riots in crowded movie theatres133 and from def-
amation and libel. The other extreme is the Soviet view which fails 
131 Enforceability of the Right of Reply or Correction. Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights Advisory Opinion (1986). supra note 11 at 55. 
132 Henkin, International Human Rights and Rights in the United States in HORTON, supra 
note 2. 
133 See Schenck v. United States. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
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to recognize any rights of communication except that of the Com-
munist party.134 Between these polar opposites is the emerging 
Third World view which often seeks to control news and informa-
tion in a broader and political sense of public order and as a com-
ponent in a claimed "right to develop." Third World nations fre-
quently assert that until their societies achieve economic and social 
independence, certain civil liberties may be subordinated. 135 
The right of free expression was a critical goal of organizers of 
the United Nations after World War II: "Freedom of Information 
... is, as the General Assembly said at its first session, the touchstone 
of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated."136 
This fundamental right was eventually enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration, but advocates for human rights in international law 
are critical of the Political Covenant which goes beyond Article 29 
of the Universal Declaration in allowing restriction on the freedom 
of information "for the protection of national security or of public 
order .... "137 The Schmidt case demonstrates how the government 
of Costa Rica sought to justify its licensing statute on the basis of 
public order. Although the Inter-American Court was clear in re-
jecting the argument that a mandatory licensing scheme was nec-
essary to ensure public order, Costa Rica and ten other Latin Amer-
ican nations continue to license journalists. That, in combination 
with affirmation of a "right of reply or correction," probably means 
that true freedom of expression, as a political and human right, will 
remain an elusive goal of international law in Latin America for 
some time to come. 
David A. Cifrino 
134 Humphrey, Political and Related Rights in MERON, supra note 3 at 185. 
135 Shestack, The jurisprudence of Human Rights in MERON, supra note 3 at 185. 
136 Humphrey, supra note 134 at 182. 
mArt. 19, Political Covenant, para 3(b). 
